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Executive 
Summary
‛Central Asia Forecasting’ is a pilot project that will be followed by an annual or bien-
nial study to analyse regional trends over time. The audience that we aim to address 
with this report comprises the broader public in Europe and Central Asia, civil soci-
ety representatives, regional experts, researchers and especially EU foreign-policy 
makers. 
For this study, a human-judgement forecasting method was employed in the form of 
an opinion survey among experts and the informed public on developments in the 
region in the next three years. In total, 144 respondents took our 20-minute survey. 
About half of the respondents are Central Asian citizens and half are from outside the 
region. The majority are affiliated with academic institutions and think tanks. This re-
port analyses the survey responses regarding domestic politics and regional affairs, 
global challenges affecting the region, and EU–Central Asian relations.
In the first part of the survey, respondents were asked about potential domestic eco-
nomic challenges and political priorities, as well as regional cooperation drivers and 
obstacles. Apart from corruption, respondents foresee that dependences on China, 
resource exports and labour migrants’ remittances, as well as ecological security 
and inequality will be the main economic challenges for the Central Asian countries 
in the next three years. Additionally, regime stability, economic reforms, protection 
of traditional values, and the development of a national identity are seen as potential 
priorities for all governments. The respondents expect that regional security issues 
will lead to greater cooperation, whereas water distribution will lead to more disputes 
between the Central Asian states. The effects on regional stability of the US with-
drawal from Afghanistan are analysed by a guest author.
When asked to evaluate the roles of external actors in the region, respondents expect 
that China’s influence in Central Asia will continue to grow. Its presence is perceived 
as a threat by some respondents in terms of economic dependence and adoption 
of surveillance technologies and other authoritarian practices. Russia’s presence in 
Central Asia is expected to increase in its traditional spheres of influence (securi-
ty and military cooperation, cultural cooperation, and labour migration), but a de-
creased role is expected for the Russian language as lingua franca in Central Asia. 
The US role in the region is expected to stagnate and decline further.
In the realm of the EU–Central Asian relations, the majority of respondents expect 
political, economic and cultural relations to remain stable. When asked about their 
preferences regarding EU engagement in Central Asia, most respondents opted for 
cooperation in human rights and education. Finally, to further elaborate on potential 
avenues for EU–Central Asian educational cooperation, we invited two guest authors 
to contribute their ideas on the issue.
The ‘Central Asia Forecasting’ study, 
aims to help strengthen EU–Central Asia 
relations. The study results are intended 
to stimulate the debate on the region, 
foster understanding of the common 
challenges and opportunities, and 
encourage data-driven policymaking. 
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Introduction
Some 30 years ago, the five countries of the Central Asian region gained their 
independence from the Soviet Union and started to engage proactively or deliberately 
avoid collaboration in the international arena. Domestic processes of state formation 
and nation-building are still ongoing. Regional cooperation and integration have 
been constrained by a variety of factors, ranging from different foreign policy goals 
to unresolved border disputes. While Central Asia covers a vast territory between 
the Caspian Sea, Russia, China and Afghanistan, with a total of 75 million people, 
it is often not represented in global debates, such as on sustainable development, 
climate change and green transformation. However, the region still constitutes an 
object of maturing academic inquiry and international foreign policymaking. In 2019, 
the European Union (EU) adopted a renewed strategy on relations with Central Asia, 
focusing on partnering for resilience and prosperity (European Commission, 2019).
We, a group of experts and researchers from the Friedrich Ebert Foundation (FES), 
the OSCE Academy in Bishkek, and the SPCE Hub collaboratively launched this 
study on ‘Central Asia Forecasting’ to survey academics, practitioners and interested 
stakeholders on upcoming developments in Central Asia in the next three years1.  In 
this report, we analyse the survey responses regarding three main areas of interest: 
domestic politics and regional affairs, global challenges affecting the region, and 
EU–Central Asian relations, including expectations regarding the EU. 
The goal of our survey and report is to contribute to strengthening EU–Central 
Asian relations by stimulating the debate on the region and encouraging data-
driven policymaking. It is our first attempt to engage with the academic and 
expert communities both in Central Asia and beyond to participate collaboratively 
in knowledge production about the region, foster understanding of the common 
challenges and opportunities, and support informed discussions at the expert and 
policy levels. It is a pilot project that will be followed by an annual or biennial study 
to analyse regional trends over time. The audience that we aim to address with this 
report are the broader public in Europe and Central Asia, civil society representatives, 
regional experts, academics and, especially, EU foreign-policy makers.
Methodology and limitations
For this study, a human-judgement forecasting method was employed2  in the form of 
an opinion survey among experts and informed public on developments in the region 
in the next three years. The experts’ judgements, combined with perceptions of a 
wider population, were supposed to ensure diversity of represented opinions. This 
combination has an edge over expert-only forecasts and has not previously been 
attempted in the context of Central Asia. 
However, it is important to note that judgement forecasting is subjective and 
has its limitations. Furthermore, this study is a pilot and needs to further develop 
its methodological base and gain more recognition and trust from the regional 
stakeholders in order to offer a more systematic and comprehensive approach to 
improve its accuracy. The reception of this report will determine its future development 
as an annual or biennial study.
Furthermore, having engaged in a participatory questionnaire making process with 
an international team and advisory group3,  we may still have missed important 
domestic and regional issues. Additionally, the survey questions were drafted in 
April–May 2021 and could not adequately address the clashes on the Kyrgyz–Tajik 
border, as well as the security situation in Afghanistan.
Data collection, cleaning and report writing
The study ‘Central Asia Forecasting’ was implemented in three phases. In the first 
phase, the questionnaire draft was prepared by the SPCE Hub and discussed with 
the implementing team, comprising the OSCE Academy and FES representatives, 
before being reviewed by the study’s advisory group. Additionally, the team 
installed the survey application – LimeSurvey4  – on a server based in the EU as 
the most suitable solution for achieving high data security and compliance with the 
European Data Protection Regulation (GDPR). Then the list of survey respondents 
(experts) was compiled by all the implementing organizations. In total, 520 experts 
(academics, think tankers, civil society and policy practitioners) were nominated, 
with approximately 43 per cent female and 57 per cent male representatives from 
Central Asia, Europe, North America, East Asia, and other regions. 
2 This study’s methodological approach was inspired by ‘Merics China Forecast’, which surveyed 170 
European China experts and about 1,000 members of the public (Merics 2021).
3 The members of the advisory group are Professor Dr Fabienne Bossuyt (Centre for EU Studies, Ghent 
University), Dr Shairbek Dzhuraev (OSCE Academy), Dr Nargis Kassenova (Program on Central Asia, 
Harvard University), Professor Dr Alexander Libman (Freie Universität Berlin), Dr Chiara Pierobon 
(University of Bielefeld), and Dr Aijan Sharshenova (OSCE Academy). They were nominated by the three 
implementing parties of the project.
 4 https://www.limesurvey.org
1 Similar forecasting studies, such as the annual ‘Top 10 Risks for Eurasia’ commissioned by the Astana Club, 
analyse the impact of global trends on Eurasia at large and lack a regional Central Asian focus (Astana 
Club 2021). The 2019 EU-funded “Central Asia in 2030: SEnECA forecasts for the region and the role of 
the European Union” study uses a scenario-building method (Gussarova and Andžans 2019). Central Asian 
Barometer and the World Bank ‘Listening to Citizens’ representative surveys are also notable studies on the 
region (Barometer 2021; World Bank 2021). However, they do not include surveys of expert groups.
11
In the second phase, the team implemented the online survey system, which ensured 
respondents’ anonymity and compliance with the EU data protection laws. The online 
survey was tested internally and with the help of the advisory group. The bilingual 
survey (in English and Russian) was launched on 16 June 2021, and was active for a 
month. Because we planned to target both experts and broader stakeholder groups, 
expert respondents were asked to complete the online questionnaire and share the 
survey with up to two people from their network who have a good understanding of 
the Central Asian region but are not involved in purely academic research. Out of 
520 invitees, 197 or 38 per cent of experts started their surveys5,  and 133 or 26 per 
cent answered all 16 questions. Only 26 people were nominated from the broader 
stakeholder group, with 15 invitees starting the survey and 11 completing it.
In total, 144 respondents or 26.4 per cent of all invitees took our 20-minute survey, 
with approximately 40 per cent female and 54 per cent male participants; 6 per cent 
declined to indicate their gender. 46 per cent of the respondents have Central Asian 
citizenship and 48 per cent stem from outside the region. Some 6 per cent declined 
to answer. A majority of respondents belong to the age group 30 to 39 (43 per cent) 
and 40 to 49 (30 per cent) years old. Some 70 per cent are currently affiliated with 
academic institutions (81 respondents) and think tanks (19 respondents); 20 per cent 
are representatives of various international organizations, civil society, and media.
In the third phase, the raw survey data was cleaned and discussed within the 
implementing team before being sent to the advisory group for feedback and initial 
impressions. Then the survey report was drafted by Oyuna Baldakova and Sebastian 
Schiek. Three external authors were invited to contribute on recent developments in 
Afghanistan and EU–Central Asia educational cooperation. Before being published, 
the draft report has undergone an internal round of revisions by some of the advisory 
group members and invited external experts6. 
Report structure
The next part of this report offers an analysis of the survey responses regarding 
domestic politics and regional affairs, global challenges affecting the region, and 
EU–Central Asian relations, including the respondents’ expectations of the EU. The 
report ends with an outlook concerning the future of this study.
5 Some e-mails did not reach their recipients due to outdated e-mail addresses or e-mail security settings.
6 The external experts invited are Dr Siddharth S. Saxena, Director of the Cambridge Central Asia Forum and 
Dr Andrea Schmitz, Senior Associate at the German Institute for International and Security Affairs (SWP).
Age of the Participants
Gender of the Participants Citizenship of the Participants
Affiliation of the Participants
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30 TO 39 YEARS
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Lack of diversification, ecological security, corruption
In the first part of the survey, respondents were asked about potential domestic 
economic challenges and political priorities, as well as regional cooperation drivers 
and obstacles. In essence, the answers we obtained are in line with mainstream 
perceptions of Central Asia.
The responses to the question on economic challenges reflect the differences between 
the Central Asian states, except for corruption, which is seen as a common challenge 
to all five countries. In the cases of Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan, the respondents 
chose the lack of economic diversification as one of the main challenges. Both 
economies are dependent on resource exports (oil and gas), which range from 60 
to 70 per cent of total exports. State revenues and economic growth are thus heavily 
dependent on international oil and gas prices. With global decarbonisation gaining 
momentum, resource dependency is gradually becoming an issue for both countries.
For Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, the dependence on remittances is seen as the major 
economic challenge. Around 30 per cent of the countries’ GDP is generated from 
remittances from labour migrants who work abroad, mainly in Russia. Similarly, 
with China playing a bigger role in all Central Asian countries as a trade partner 
and investor, the survey respondents see economic dependence on China as a 
challenge, especially for Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. 
Ecological security is seen as one of the main challenges to the economy of 
Uzbekistan. But in fact, all five countries are prone to global warming and increasingly 
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In your view, what will be the central challenges facing the economies of Kazakhstan, 
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Political priorities: economic reform and regime stability
The respondents were also asked to choose the three most likely political priorities 
of the Central Asian governments in the next three years, from a list with nine 
options (Figure 2). Again, the respondents’ opinions reflect the diversity of Central 
Asian states. While regime stability is seen as a major concern for all governments, 
Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan stand out, with ‘economic reforms’ regarded as the top 
government priorities in the next three years.
For Uzbekistan, the majority of respondents see economic reforms as the 
government’s most likely top priority (74 per cent of all respondents; among Central 
Asian respondents the figure was as high as 80 per cent), while regime stability 
ranks second. For Kazakhstan, nearly half of the respondents believe that economic 
reforms will probably be prioritized by the government. For both countries, around 
50 per cent of the experts surveyed believe that socio-economic-stability is another 
likely priority. 
This assessment of Uzbekistan corresponds with the fundamental reforms President 
Mirziyoyev has implemented since taking office in 2016, including currency reform, 
reforms to end forced labour in the cotton industry, and pluralization of public 
discourse. The results of the survey show that Mirziyoyev's reputation as an economic 
reformer is still very high, not only outside Central Asia, but also in adjacent countries, 
such as Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan.
The Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Turkmenistan governments’ priorities are perceived 
by respondents differently: the majority expect a focus on the ‘protection of traditional 
values’ and the ‘development of a national identity.’
Intra-regional relations
The respondents expect that regional security issues will lead to greater cooperation 
between the Central Asian states (Figure 3). The issue gained further importance 
with the Taliban’s overthrow of the Afghan government following the US withdrawal 
from the country (see p.16). Respondents also expect an increase in cooperation 
on transnational infrastructure and trade policy. In the latter field, new dynamics are 
emerging through Uzbekistan's aspiration to join the World Trade Organisation and 
the European Union's GSP+ scheme (European Commission, 2021).
The distribution of regional water has repeatedly led to disputes between the 
states that are upstream (Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan) and downstream (Kazakhstan, 
Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan) of the main rivers Amu Darya and Syr Darya. Some 75 
per cent of respondents of this study expect this to be an issue leading to greater 
disagreements between the states.
Because the survey questionnaire was drafted in April–May 2021 before and during 

































In your opinion, which objectives will the governments of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, 
Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan most likely prioritize in the next three years?














Relations with the EU
Relations with Russia












In your view, which of these issues will lead to greater cooperation and which to 
greater disagreements between the Central Asian states in the next three years?
28% 64%




More Disagreements No Change More Cooperation
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Effects of the US withdrawal from 
Afghanistan on regional stability
Temur Umarov, Carnegie Moscow
The new political crisis in Afghanistan after the Taliban returned to power in Kabul 
following the US withdrawal has raised a lot of questions about the fate of the 
neighbouring countries of Central Asia. Although these events did not come as 
a surprise, regional decision-makers, experts, as well as ordinary citizens have 
concerns about the potential refugee crisis, growing drug trafficking, possible 
terrorist attacks, and the growth of radical Islam inside the region. 
However, it is important not to underestimate the level of resistance that Central 
Asian states have developed since the Taliban was last in power, 20 years ago. The 
political regimes are much stronger now than they were in the late 1990s, and this is 
the major trend for all Central Asian countries (with some exceptions for Kyrgyzstan). 
For this reason, the crisis of power in Afghanistan will only accelerate a wide-ranging 
set of processes of tightening government control over society inside the Central 
Asian regimes.
Another big change from the situation 20 years ago has happened in relations 
between Central Asian states. The last time the Taliban was in power, Central Asian 
countries were not ready to coordinate their policies and actions with each other. 
Now (especially after Shavkat Mirziyoyev came to power in Uzbekistan) Central 
Asia has started to take baby steps towards more regional cooperation. Importantly, 
this cooperation is happening exclusively among the five countries (without the 
participation of Russia, China or other non-regional actors).
Although the policies of Central Asian governments towards Afghanistan and their 
relations with the Taliban may differ (all except for Tajikistan have established official 
contacts with the Taliban), they have similar security concerns. The number-one 
concern for regional governments and societies is a broader destabilization of the 
region, which includes several real threats, which differ from country to country. While 
for Tajikistan the potential of terrorist attacks seems to be the most urgent risk, this is 
not the case for Uzbekistan. The same applies to drug trafficking, which is becoming 
a major problem not only for Tajikistan but also for Turkmenistan. 
Now, more than ever before, Central Asian states are ready to discuss with each 
other their positions in the most sensitive areas, such as security. It is still too early 
to talk about coordination, however, especially considering the territorial issues that 
some Central Asian states have with each other. But when it comes to Afghanistan, 
Uzbekistan puts itself in the leading position to design a policy that other countries 
tend to echo. Even if they do not follow Tashkent’s path, like Dushanbe, they are still 
able to find a middle ground that allows them to conduct joint military drills and for 
the military personnel of both countries to build up a good rapport with one another.
Recommendations for the EU
The Taliban’s victory in Afghanistan could transform not only the Central Asian 
regimes but their attitude to the outside world. In the eyes of Central Asian states, 
the US withdrawal from Afghanistan is tantamount to its withdrawal from the whole 
region. People in Central Asia in the past few years have stopped believing that the 
United States is prepared to act as a counterbalance to Russia and China in the 
region. Consequently, this has led to the growth of Russian and Chinese influence in 
all sectors in the region.
However, this also means that Central Asian states will be striving to further diversify 
their relations with countries beyond Russia and China, and Europe is set to play a 
greater role in the future of this region. So, it is important for the EU to be involved 
in the future development of Central Asia and to offer those countries an alternative 
partnership opportunity.
What is more important for the EU is to get involved in the security dimension as 
well, so that the Central Asian states are not stuck between Russia and China in 
this sensitive area. But the EU should keep two factors in mind. First, EU-Central 
Asian cooperation will be impossible if aimed against Russian or Chinese interests. 
Afghanistan and everything around the Afghan crisis seem to be a rare instance in 
which all (European, Russian, Chinese, American) have the same goal. This should 
be the focus of potential cooperation. This cooperation could take the form of training 
and exchange programmes for military personnel, discussion of policies on customs 
control against the background of growing drug trafficking, cooperating on refugees 
and so on. 
Second, for the EU it is important to distinguish between the real threats and 
government-supported narratives that some regimes in Central Asia broadcast 
to attract international attention. For example, Tajikistan wants to be seen as the 
only country that provides support to the anti-Taliban movement, as well as to 
Afghanistan’s national minorities. While this rhetoric has not been converted into real 
action (Dushanbe refuses to accommodate even a small number of refugees who 
are stuck on the Tajik-Afghan border), Tajikistan has already achieved some of its 
goals: president Rahmon for now is the only Central Asian leader who has been 
invited to visit Europe and discuss Afghanistan.
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Growing China
The second part of our survey focuses on the perception of global powers and their 
projected influence in Central Asia. When asked to select the top five extra-regional 
countries that the Central Asian governments are likely to prioritize, respondents 
positioned Russia and China as the top two (Figure 4). These countries are tied as 
the most preferred partners in Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, the two most developed 
economies. In Kyrgyzstan, a clearer preference is given to Russia, in Tajikistan and 
Turkmenistan to China. 
Given that China is a relatively new actor in the region compared with Russia, this 
projection highlights a clear trend: China’s role is expected to grow and challenge 
Russia’s position as the most preferred partner in the region. In terms of trade 
volumes, China is already the biggest trading partner by imports for Kyrgyzstan and 
Uzbekistan, and second biggest (after the EU) for Kazakhstan (China Briefing, 2021). 
However, China’s presence is perceived as a threat by some of the respondents. 
Economic dependence on China is selected as the third most relevant challenge 
for Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan in Question 1 on economic challenges from Part 1 of 
this survey. Furthermore, participants of this survey expect that the Central Asian 
governments are most likely to adopt surveillance technologies and other authoritarian 
practices from China (Figure 5). This perception is likely to be driven by a rapid 
adoption of Chinese ICT technologies to implement “Safe City” projects throughout 
some of the Central Asian capitals. These projects utilize facial recognition cameras 
that monitor the citizens and levy fines while increasing the state’s surveillance 
capacity (Kassenova & Duprey, 2021; Marat & Sutton, 2021). 
Global Challenges
Figure 4
In your view, which partner countries will Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, 
Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan prioritize in the next three years?
Russia Russia
China








Kyrgyzstan Tajikistan Turkmenistan Uzbekistan
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Stable Russia
Russia’s presence is expected to increase in its traditional spheres of influence in 
Central Asia: security and military cooperation, cultural cooperation, and labour 
migration (Figure 6). In the former field, the recent US withdrawal from Afghanistan 
and the resurgence of the Taliban accentuate the need to strengthen the Russian 
security umbrella even further over the Central Asian republics. For more analysis on 
the role of external powers in the security situation in Central Asia, please refer to our 
Infobox on Afghanistan.
The respondents do not expect any changes in such areas as high-level political 
cooperation, economic cooperation, education exchange, influence of the Russian 
media, as well as digital and technological influence. They also do not foresee that 
the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU), the Russian-led regional economic institution, 
would change or deepen regional integration (Figure 7). Some 24 per cent of 
respondents predict that the EAEU will expand with more Central Asian countries, 
such as Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, joining the Economic Union. Membership of 
the EAEU offers countries enhanced cooperation with Russia, including possible 
expansion of labour migration, as well as free movement of goods and capital within 
the bloc. Uzbekistan became an observer to the Union in December 2020, but 
does not seem to be in a hurry to join as a full member (Hashimova, 2021). Being 
dependent on remittances sent from Russia, Tajikistan stresses its sovereignty and 
is perceived to be even less likely than Uzbekistan to join the EAEU (Madiyev, 2021).
Security and Military Cooperations
State Surveillance 
through Technology
It won’t change drastically
Authoritatian Practices
It will expand (more Central 
Asia countries will join, e.g. 
Uzbekistan, Tajikistan)
Infrastructure Connectivity
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In your opinion, from which of the following policies pursued by China will the 
Central Asian governments most likely learn in the next three years? 
Please, choose three policies at most.
In your opinion, how will the Eurasian Economic Union develop in the next 3 years?
Finally, the respondents expect a decrease in the use of the Russian language as 
lingua franca in Central Asia. The process of de-Russification has been effectively 
materializing throughout the region for the past 30 years since the independence 
of the Central Asian states. Generational change, outflow of Russian-speaking 
population, nation-building processes and an increasing role of national languages 
have all contributed to the process. The official status of the Russian language was 
preserved only in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan. Furthermore, in the early 1990s, both 
Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan resolved to switch to the Latin alphabet. In Kazakhstan, 
the shift from the Cyrillic to the Latin alphabet was announced in 2017 and is expected 
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Stagnating United States 
Respondents foresee stagnation of the US role in the region. Only security cooperation 
and human rights issues are expected to be more actively supported by the Biden 
administration. These results are not surprising given the recent US withdrawal 
from Afghanistan (see p.16), as well as the focus on human rights in Joe Biden 
administration’s foreign policy (as opposed to Donald Trump’s). 
Economic Cooperation
Pressure to Fight Corruption
Support of Decabornization
Security Cooperation
Human Rights and Civil Society
Figure 8
In your opinion, will the Biden administration be more or less active in Central Asia 




















The respondents of the study were also invited to share their opinion on the future 
of EU–Central Asian relations for the next three years. The majority of respondents 
expect political, economic and cultural relations to remain stable. When asked about 
the impact of EU policies on Central Asia, most respondents foresee either no impact 
on the region at all or some positive impact in the cases of the EU development 
cooperation and Europe–Asia connectivity strategy (Figure 9).
The current crisis in Afghanistan after the withdrawal of US troops – which started 
after the survey was completed – is very likely to have an impact on EU–Central 
Asia cooperation and might further stimulate high-level political dialogue as well as 
development and security cooperation. Nevertheless, it remains a challenge for the 
EU, the largest official development assistance donor in Central Asia, to establish 
relevant areas for cooperation with the region and become more effective and visible 
on the ground. 
Figure 9
In your opinion, how will the following EU policies affect the region in the next 
three years?
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Focusing on educational cooperation
A possible answer to the challenge of effectiveness and visibility could be a stronger 
focus on cooperation in education between the EU and Central Asia. At the end 
of the survey, the respondents were asked in which areas they would like to see 
the EU and Central Asia primarily cooperating in the next three years (Figure 10). 
The respondents could choose from a list of 12 options. The majority opted for 
7%
26
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Educational cooperation ranks second among the issues the respondents regard as 
most important. Additionally, when asked to propose concrete projects for EU–Central 
Asian cooperation, the respondents primarily mentioned projects in education. 
For example, ‘more BA, MA, PhD, and Erasmus scholarships for Central Asian 
students’ or ‘capacity building in the areas of STEM (science, technology, engineering, 
and mathematics) research and industrial diversification, which is the heart of 
climate, energy, and food security... a contextualized co-production of knowledge, 
solutions, and human capital.’ We decided to invite two guest authors to contribute 
their ideas on EU–Central Asian educational cooperation (p.27 and 28). They argue 
that education is not only something the EU can offer in terms of cooperation with the 
region, but also key to economic growth, human well-being, and security, something 
which is becoming even more important for the region, given that it is in the direct 
neighbourhood of unstable Afghanistan.
Investing long-term in education
Jos Boonstra, EUCAM coordinator
CESS, Netherlands
The 2019 European Union Strategy for Central Asia emphasizes ‘investment in 
youth, education, innovation, and culture’. With a view to long-term development and 
cooperation, a specific focus on education should indeed be the priority in EU–Central 
Asian relations.
First, cooperation should not be confined to EU education programmes and budgets. 
The EU should also use its development and economic programme funds to boost 
support for education. In doing so, it could develop bilateral tailor-made programmes 
with Central Asian countries that go beyond higher education by also addressing 
basic and vocational education, involving pupils and teachers alike. Corruption and 
brain-drain concerns would also need to be addressed in such national programmes. 
Meanwhile, the EU could also serve as a broker and bridge between member 
states with their schools, universities, and training centres and their Central Asian 
counterparts. 
Second, there is a need for Central Asia’s ‘young professionals’ to gain work 
experience. The EU could fund and help initiate (vocational) internships, traineeships 
and fellowships at European institutions, companies and civil society organisations. 
Bringing young professionals to Europe for a learning experience will help shape 
them in their (professional) lives at home. Meanwhile, we should not forget to 
encourage European young people to gain experience in Central Asia; it cannot be 
a one-way street. 
Third, such a broad and deep investment would also help the EU meet its 2019 
strategic objective of boosting academic and think tank research cooperation and 
innovation. After gaining first-hand knowledge in training and education abroad, 
European and Central Asian scholars will be better able to come together in joint 
research. 
Greater long-term European investment in education in Central Asia will help Europe 
and Central Asia meet their stated priorities of resilience, prosperity and better 
cooperation. Moreover, it will help to foster mutual knowledge and understanding 
between the two regions.
Human Rights, Rule of Law 
















In your opinion, the EU and Central Asian states should primarily cooperate in 













cooperation in human rights (49 per cent), followed by educational cooperation (42 per 
cent) and environmental protection (35 per cent). The first result seems contradictory 
because most respondents also believed that the EU would have no impact on human 
rights and the rule of law (Figure 9). However, survey participants might suggest that 
the EU is one of the few actors in Central Asia that could exert external pressure to 
contribute to an improvement of the human rights situation in the region.
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Raising educational cooperation 
between the EU and Central Asia 
to a new level
Professor Alisher Faizullaev, 
DSc, PhD
 
Education is among the priorities in relations between the European Union (EU) and 
the countries of Central Asia (CA). Tempus, Erasmus Mundus, Erasmus+, EU-Central 
Asia Education Platform (CAEP), the European Education Initiative for Central Asia 
have contributed to the development of higher education and vocational training in 
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. 
However, I believe that education should not be just one priority area in relations 
between the EU and Central Asia, but the priority. Attention to the problems and 
development of education in Central Asia should be sharply increased. To do this, it 
is advisable to consider the following suggestions:
1. To be more visible and impactful, the educational projects supported by the EU 
should be large-scale. This could include the creation of European universities in 
each Central Asian country, including the establishment of online universities, 
courses and training programmes. 
2. It would be desirable to increase the number of students from Central Asia in EU 
universities to at least 100,000 annually (currently there are only about 10,000), to 
significantly enlarge the Erasmus+ programme for Central Asia (with the opportunity 
to continue education at EU universities for up to one year or more) and to expand 
teacher training programmes, as well as to make it possible to participate in 
educational and exchange programmes not only for institutional but also for individual 
participants. 
3. The entire infrastructure supporting exchanges in education and research should 
be developed. This should include visa and travel support, the application system, 
exchange of information and books, access to libraries, and so on. 
Raising cooperation in education to a new level would meet the mutual and long-term 
interests of both sides. 
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Central Asia Forecasting 2021 
‘Central Asia Forecasting 2021’ is a pilot study. To launch the study, we 
spent a significant amount of time focusing on the technical intricacies, 
primarily to ensure overall data security, our respondents’ anonymity 
and compliance with EU data protection law. The purpose of this study 
was to set up an infrastructure that will enable us to implement follow-up 
studies that could target larger expert and informed public groups. 
The project partners plan to continue the study in the upcoming years. 
Based on the experience of this pilot study, we aim to make improve-
ments in the following areas:
◊ A response rate of about one-third of all invitees can be satisfactory 
for a pilot study. Nevertheless, we would like to increase the number 
of respondents by inviting significantly more experts to participate in 
the survey. In addition, we hope that the project will become better 
known in the coming years and that more experts will be willing to 
accept the invitation and fill in the online questionnaire. 
◊ To better involve the informed public, we are discussing the 
possibility of cooperating with a survey institute based in Central 
Asia. 
◊ The design of the questionnaire should be even more participatory 
and inclusive through the involvement of a variety of experts. 
If you have any criticisms or suggestions concerning the study design 
and this report, we would be very happy to receive your feedback. 
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